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The average American's exposure to issues concerning battered
women has increased dramatically over the past two decades. In
spite of society's increased awareness of the predicament of battered
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1. Increased media attention to the problem has undoubtedly contributed to the
education of the public regarding the prevalence of domestic violence in the United States.
Cases which gained national prominence and enormous attention from the media include those
involving Joel Steinberg, Hedda Nussbaum, and more recently, John and Lorena Bobbitt. See
SAM ERLICH, LISA, HEDDA AND JOEL THE STEINBERG MURDER CASE (1989); Maria E. Odum,
Irreconcilable Differences Revealed: Women's Groups Hail a Verdict that Makes Some Grown Men Wail.
WASH. Posr, Jan. 22, 1994, at Al (explaining that "for experts on domestic violence, [the
verdict] was a signal that spousal abuse will not be tolerated"). More recently the murder of
Nicole Simpson brought domestic violence to the attention of the media. See Sarah Booth
Conroy, Chronicles Wife Beating: An Age Old Stoy, WASH. POST, July 11, 1994, at B3 (noting that
"[w]ith the Nicole Simpson tragedy screaming in our minds, some forget that family violence
is nothing new"); Barbara Vobejda, Battered Women's Cy Relayed Up From Grass Roots, WASH. POST,
July 6, 1994, at Al (stating that Nicole Brown Simpson's murder "has elevated domestic violence
to a new level on the national consciousness"). Recognition of the problem was also evident at
the 1994 Oscar Awards, when Defending Their Lives, a documentary focusing on battered women
in Massachusetts, won the award for Best Documentary. The film dealt with women who killed
their batterers as well as women who were killed by their batterers. DEFENDING THEIR LIVES
(Cambridge Doc. Films, Inc. 1994). Finally, the growth of state and local services addressing
domestic violence, although clearly insufficient, demonstrates the increased recognition of it as
a widespread social ill. See infra notes 196-97.
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women, domestic battering remains epidemic.2 At best, attempts to
eradicate the problem are piecemeal; at worst, the community's
disregard of battered women borders on criminal.' Recent statistics
indicate that a minimum of two million women are "severely
assaulted" by their male partners during an average twelve month
period in the United States.4 These incidents are not isolated,' and
2. "About 30 percent [sic] of the women murdered in 1990 were killed by husbands or
boyfriends, according to the FBI." Don Colburn, Domestic Violence: What Can Be Done?, AMA
President Decries 'A Major Public Health Problem, 'WASH. POsT,June 28,1994, (Health), at 10. "Every
15 seconds on average, the FBI estimates, a woman is beaten by her husband or boyfriend." Id.
While the number of shelters has grown from zero to approximately 1500 since the early 1970s,
estimates of the prevalence of domestic violence far outstrip any such capacity. NATIONAL
CLEARINGHOUSE FOR THE DEFENSE OF BATTERED WOMEN, STATISTICS PACKET 20 (3d ed. 1993)
[hereinafter CLEARINGHOUSE] (citing Sarah Glaser, Violence Against Women, 3 C.O. RESEARCHER
171, 173 (Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1993)). For example, in New York City alone, with a
population of approximately 8 million, 59% of battered women and their children in search of
shelter in the City's programs are turned away due to lack of space. Id. at 175 (citing Olga Dwyer
& Eileen Tully, Housing for Battered Women, N.Y. ST. OFF. FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE 9 (1989)). The National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women offers
a 223-page 1993 Statistics Packet, 3d edition, for those interested in domestic violence in
general, and the defense of battered women who kill their abusers, in particular. This resource
is invaluable, offering a plethora of statistical data on battered women's issues. The mailing
address for the Clearinghouse is 125 So. 9th Street, Suite 302, Philadelphia, PA 19107; phone
number. (215) 351-0010.
3. See Raucci v. Town of Rotterdam, 902 F.2d 1050, 1060-62 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that
where a "special relationship" existed between a victim and the police which caused the victim
to detrimentally rely on the police to protect her, and its officers failed to do so, the munici-
pality can be held liable). In response to both continued criticism of the police's failure to take
domestic violence complaints seriously and studies indicating that arrest is an effective deterrent,
several police forces have instituted "mandatory arrest" policies. See Saul N. Weingart, Adding
Insult to Injury: Domestic Violence and Public Policy 87 (1989) (unpublished dissertation,
Harvard University) (indicating that "[a]s a result of the Minneapolis study [which found
mandatory arrest to be effective at reducing domestic violence recidivism], mandatory arrest
policies have been adopted in Oregon, Washington, and a number of smallerjurisdictions"); see
also Miriam H. Ruttenberg, A Feminist Citique of Mandatory Arrest: An Analysis of Race and Gender
in Domestic Violence Policy, 2 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 171 (1994). Bias against battered women in
the courtroom is further evident injudges often deplorable handling of domestic violence cases.
SeeWeingart, supra, at 94 (explaining that "[r] ecent studies of the judicial response to domestic
violence continue to document the failure of thejudiciary to take seriously family violence, even
in the face of clear-cut statutory mandates"); see also ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATrERED WOMEN
KILL 169-70 (1987) (describing one judge's attitude that domestic violence is a problem to be
solved within the family unit and his refusal to assist a battered woman seeking judicial
intervention on her behalf; less than six months later, the woman was found after she had been
shot, strangled, and stabbed to death by her husband); RICHARDJ. GELLES & CLAIRE P. CORNELL,
INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN FAMILIFS 135 (2d ed. 1990) (noting "[o]nly a tiny fraction of incidents
of marital violence reach a courtroom"). When batterers are prosecuted, the sentences are
minimal, and are frequently suspended. Id. (citing courts' actions as including "dismissing the
charges, warning the abuser, requiring the abuser to enter counseling, fining the abuser, jail,
or a suspended sentence"); CHARLES P. EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL 16 (noting that
"judges are notoriously reluctant to sentence convicted batterers to jail or prison"). Progress in
the area of battered women shelters has been woefully inadequate. See infra note 196 (discussing
that an unacceptable number of battered women seeking shelter are turned away due to lack
of space).
4. "Researchers in the field agree that a more accurate national estimate would be a figure
of 4 million women severely assaulted by male partners annually, and an estimate of 40% of
adult couples having experienced at least one aggressive incident in their current relationship."
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studies indicate that domestic violence cuts across racial, economic,
educational, and religious statuses.6 Social costs of domestic violence
are enormous.7 Injuries sustained during domestic assaults account
for an estimated nineteen to thirty percent of all injured women
seeking emergency room treatment.8 The emotional and psychologi-
cal costs are inestimable.
Historically, the existence of battered women spans several waves of
social consciousness.9 The women's movement of the 1960s and
1970s brought to modem society's attention an often ignored and
CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 2, at 91 (citing Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary on
Legislation to Reduce the Growing Problem of Volent Crimes Against Women, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 117
(Dec. 11, 1990) (testimony of Angela Browne)). "At least 2 million women a year are assaulted
by their husbands or boyfriends and some experts say that because of underreporting the actual
number of assaults may be twice as high." Colburn, supra note 2, at 10. Two years ago the
American Medical Association reported that as many as 1 in 3 women in any given year (4
million per year) will be assaulted by a domestic partner. SeeJill Smolowe, Mhen Domestic Violence
Hits Home TIME, July 4, 1994, at 19, 20.
5. See CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 2, at 113 (noting that "[a] battering incident is rarely
an isolated occurrence; it usually recurs frequently. According to a 1982 survey of women in
Texas, 19% of the women who were abused during the previous year and 25% of the women
abused during their lifetime had been victimized at least once a week." (citing Raymond H.C.
Teske & Mary L. Parker, Spouse Abuse in Texas: A Study of Women's Attitudes and Experiences, 7
RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE FAM. & SEXUAL ASSAULT 1 (1983)). In her study of battered women who
kill, Angela Browne discovered "[t]he frequency with which abusive incidents occurred increased
over time, with 40 percent [sic] in the homicide group reporting that violent incidents occurred
more than once a week by the end of the relationship." BROWNE, supra note 3, at 68.
6. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2827 (1992)
(recognizing that "[w]omen of all class levels, educational backgrounds, and racial, ethnic and
religious groups are battered"); BRONE, supra note 3, at 3 (explaining that violence in families
is not limited to the poor or working class; instead it is common among all income and
education levels).
7. See Teri Randall, Abuse at Work Drains People, Money, and Medical Workplace Not Immune,
267JAMA 1439, 1440 (1992) (stating that a Centers for Disease Control 1989 report estimates
the cost of domestic violence at $45 billion, mostly attributable to medical costs, and a Bureau
of National Affairs Inc. report estimates that domestic violence costs employers $3 to $5 billion
annually, which includes "lost employee work hours, increased health costs, higher turnover
rates, and lower productivity").
8. Colburn, supra note 2, at 10. See also BROWNE, supra note 3, at 6-9 (citing the statistics
of studies discussing the prevalence of men seriously assaulting female partners and concluding,
after extrapolating emergency room admissions of injurious assaults on women and applying the
figures to the United States, that "between 1.5 and 2 million women seek medical treatment
each year because of an assault by a male partner").
9. For an excellent source detailing the history of domestic violence, see ELIZABETH PLECK,
DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM
COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1987). Pleck notes,
[m]any people think that family violence was discovered in the 1960s ... yet there
were two earlier periods of reform against family violence in American history. From
1640 to 1680, the Puritans of colonial Massachusetts enacted the first laws anywhere in
the world against wife beating and 'unnatural severity' to children. A second reform
epoch lasted from 1874 to about 1890, when societies for the prevention of cruelty to
children ... were founded and smaller efforts on behalf of battered women... were
initiated.
Id. at 3-4.
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usually misunderstood problem.10 Society's growing awareness of the
prevalence of domestic violence resulted in an increasing perception
that women were victimized not only by their partners, but also by an
uncaring judicial system."
Attorneys hired to defend battered women accused of killing their
abusers began to seek admission of evidence about the violent
situations within which these women felt compelled to remain. A
growing number of battered women who previously either pleaded
guilty or raised an insanity defense began to plead self-defense. 2
One of the essential elements of self-defense is whether the defendant
reasonably perceived herself to be in imminent or immediate
danger. 3 Depending on the jurisdiction, this test may be more
subjective, allowing the jury to consider evidence about the surround-
ing circumstances and the defendant's frame of mind, or more
objective, adhering to a strict "reasonable man" standard. 4
10. SeeLINDA GORDON, HEROES OFTHEIR OWN LVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY
VIOLENCE 1, 1 (1988) (noting that in the past twenty-five years family violence became a social
problem within the United States). "Starting with a wave of concern about child abuse in the
1960s, the concern widened to include wife-beating, incest,... and marital rape, as the women's
liberation movement of the 1970s drew those crimes to public attention." Id. It is not within the
scope of this paper to specifically address issues concerning battered men in general, or those
men who kill their partners in the context of self-defense. The fact that the overwhelming
majority of those being battered are women, and those doing the battering are men, was a key
consideration in arriving at this decision. See Colburn, supra note 2, at 10 (stating that according
to the Department ofJustice "an estimated 95 percent of assaults against spouses are committed
by men against women"); Justice Department Examines Homicide in Families, WASH. POSTJuly 11,
1994, at A9 (explaining that "[h]usbands kill their wives more often than wives slay their
husbands.. ." and "[when spouse murdered spouse, the husband was the assailant in almost
two-thirds of the cases").
11. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial system's often
ineffective, frequently callous treatment of battered women).
12. As a practical matter ... the legal defenses available to battered women who kill
are generally quite limited. As a rule, there is no question that the woman killed her
batterer... in most cases, there is little question the killing was intentional. The result
is that most battered women who kill must either raise an insanity defense or plead
self-defense.
EWING, supra note 3, at 45. For an especially vigorous attack on the use of Battered Woman
Syndrome in self-defense cases, see generally David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome
and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619 (1986).
13. See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 374 (N.J. 1984) (explaining that the jury ultimately
determines if the defendant did believe it was necessary to use deadly force to prevent an
"imminent, grave attack"). The difference between imminent and immediate "stated simply, is
between a requirement that the focus be on the circumstances, including past events,
surrounding the defendant's action [imminent] and a requirement that the focus be limited to
the particular instant of the defendant's action [immediate]." Holly Maguigan, Battered Women
and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 414
(1991).
14. SeeMaguigan, supra note 13, at 409 (explaining that the majority ofjurisdictions instruct
the jury to use a standard which includes the defendant's subjective view). In her article,
Maguigan notes that standards governing reasonableness can be further sub-divided into
objective, subjective, a combination of subjective-objective, and a "reasonably prudent battered
woman." Id. at 409 nn.105-06.
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In support of her self-defense plea, a defendant typically will
attempt to offer expert testimony on the "Battered Woman Syn-
drome."'5 Testimony on the Syndrome is relevant in homicide cases
for at least two interconnected reasons: to assist the jury in evaluating
the reasonableness of the woman's act,16 and to educate the judge
and jury about the "myths and misconceptions" surrounding women
who remain in battering relationships.' 7 The latter role of the
testimony, while not addressing the specific legal elements of self-
defense, impacts the woman's credibility." If the defendant lacks
credibility in the jury's eyes, her chances of successfully proving self-
defense diminish.
Literature is continuously developing on the concept of the
Battered Woman Syndrome. 9 Arguably, two of the quintessential
volumes on battered women and the Syndrome are The Battered
Woman20 and The Battered Woman Syndrome 1 by Dr. Lenore Walk-
15. First, the expert describes the battered woman syndrome. Generally, the expert
explains the three-stage cycle of violence posited by Walker. the 'tension building'
stage, where the abuse is relatively minor; the 'acute battering' stage, where the woman
is severely beaten; and the stage of 'loving contrition,' where the batterer temporarily
stops abusing the woman, seeks forgiveness, and promises to reform. The expert then
describes (1) how the physical and psychological abuse escalates as the cycle repeats
itself; and (2) the psychological consequences for the battered woman: learned
helplessness, depression, incapacitation, and false hope that the batterer will change.
Finally, the expert usually explains how these consequences, combined with economic
and social factors... prevent battered women from leaving their batterers.
EWING, supra note 3, at 51-52 (footnotes omitted).
16. See EWING, supra note 3, at 53 (stating that "expert testimony regarding the battered
woman syndrome is believed by some courts to be directly relevant to the reasonableness of the
woman's belief that she was threatened with death or serious bodily injury at the time of the
killing"). For a thorough discussion of self-defense claims by battered women and how they are
treated by the judicial system, see generally Maguigan, supra note 13 (discussing, among other
topics: different jurisdictions' substantive self-defense laws; their evidentiary rules regarding
expert testimony, the recent wave of attempts to reform self-defense to include a separate
standard for women; and, generally, the argument that the problem is not with the law of self-
defense, but rather with the trial judges' applications of that law).
17. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing. Women's Self-Defense Work and the
Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 14 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 213, 219-20 (1992) (reporting
that "[a] battered woman who kills her batterer has to overcome special myths and misconcep-
tions about battered women").
18. See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (NJ. 1984) (explaining that credibility is crucial to a
battered woman's claim of self-defense). "If the jury does not believe [her] account, it cannot
find she acted in self-defense." Id. at 375.
19. Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of
Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1195 (1993) (arguing that a redefinition of
the concept of the Battered Woman Syndrome is necessary for two major reasons: "(1)
testimony concerning the experiences of battered women refers to more than their
psychological reactions to violence, and (2) battered women's diverse psychological realities are
not limited to one particular 'profile'"). See infra note 29 (discussing the trend of accepting this
Syndrome).
20. LENORE WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN (1979) (discussing the theory of learned
helplessness as it applies to battered women).
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er.22  Developing what is commonly known as the Battered Woman
Syndrome, Dr. Walker propounds the theory of "learned helpless-
ness"23 and the cyclical nature of battering incidents to explain the
actions of battered women.24 Walker's hypothesis originates in the
research of Martin Seligman, which dealt with laboratory dogs
repeatedly subjected to electric shocks.' After discovering that they
were unable to avoid being shocked regardless of what they did, these
dogs exhibited behavior dubbed "learned helplessness. 26  As a
result, the dogs ceased all voluntary escape activity; even when
researchers tried to teach the dogs to escape, the dogs remained
entirely passive.27 Walker's analysis extends this theory to battered
women in an effort to explain why they frequently do not leave their
abusers, decline to prosecute them, or behave in a manner inconsis-
tent with what society deems normal.28
As the theory of Battered Woman Syndrome gained acceptance,
29
21. LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984) (detailing the psychological
issues of domestic violence, reviewing literature in the field, and applying the findings to law and
clinical psychology).
22. See Faigman, supra note 12, at 622 (identifying Walker as "the preeminent researcher
in this field" and stating that courts most often rely on her work in their decisions concerning
admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome testimony) (citing State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 371
(NJ. 1984) ("relying almost exclusively on Walker's theory and referring to her as a 'prominent
writer' in the field")). In addition, the note asserts that "[1]aw review commentary similarly
recognizes Walker's central role in bringing battered woman syndrome evidence to the
courtroom." Id. at 622 n.10 (citing Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Wyo. 1981)).
23. See WALKER, supra note 21, at 2, 8-10, 33, 86-94, 100, 196-201 (considering learned
helplessness as an explanatory theory of phenomenons including, but not limited to, why
battered women do not leave and what factors contribute to their reaching this state).
24. See WALKER, supra note 21, at 2, 84, 95-104 (discussing the "Walker Cycle Theory of
Violence"); see also supra note 15 (describing the three stages of the cycle theory).
25. WALKER, supra note 21, at 86 (citing MARTiN E. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS: ON
DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEATH 21-25 (1975)) (explaining that Walker's hypothesis was
aided by research done by Seligman and his colleagues demonstrating that, when dogs were
repeatedly and non-contingently shocked, theywere unable to escape from a painful situation,
even when escape was quite possible and readily apparent). See Lyn Y. Abramson, Martin E.
Seligman & John Teasdale, Learned Helplessness in Humans: Critique and Reformation, 8 7 J. OF
ABNORMAL PSYCHOL 49, 49-50 (1978) (reformulating earlier studies of learned helplessness by
providing a human analogue to the original animal studies).
26. WALKER, supra note 21, at 86 (explaining that "[b]oth depressed humans and helpless
animals exhibited motivational deficits in the laboratory").
27. See WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND How SoCIETY
RESPONDS 49-50 (1989) (stating that it was only after the dogs were "repeatedly dragged to the
cage exits" that their learned helplessness disappeared).
28. See generally WALKER, supra note 21, at 33, 86, 89 (demonstrating that most literature,
at least in the legal field, continues to cite learned helplessness as a seemingly integral
component of the Battered Woman Syndrome).
29. For an analysis of the trend towards acceptance of Battered Woman Syndrome, see
Cynthia L. Coffee, Note, A Trend Emerges: A State Survey on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony
Concerning the Battered Woman Syndrome 25 J. FAM. L. 373 (1986-87) (discussing those states
unconditionally admitting the evidence, those conditionally admitting it, and those holding it
inadmissible). Numerous courts cite learned helplessness and the cycle of violence theory as the
scientific basis supporting their original acceptance of expert testimony on the subject. SeeState
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defense lawyers introduced it as evidence to support the woman's self-
defense plea. Courts, by admitting expert testimony on the Battered
Woman Syndrome, implicitly-and often explicitly-accepted Walker's
characterization of battered women as suffering from learned
helplessness."0 Admission of the Battered Woman Syndrome as an
appropriate topic of expert testimony is a fortunate outcome of the
courts' acceptance of learned helplessness. However, several com-
mentators recently began to focus on the negative aspects of such a
characterization."3 In addition to problems inherent within the
theory, 2 much empirical work specifically does not support the
portrayal of many battered women as victims of learned helpless-
ness,33 further complicating a difficult evidentiary problem.
In light of these contradictory accounts, this article surveys current
research on the behavior and reactions of battered women to their
violent situations. The article begins by comparing and contrasting
the theory of learned helplessness with an alternative theory of
v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 377 (N.J. 1984) (claiming a common characteristic of battered women
is learned helplessness); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 819 (N.D. 1983) (indicating that
learned helplessness is a manifestation of Battered Woman Syndrome); State v. Buhrle, 627 P.2d
1374, 1377 (Wyo. 1981) (indicating the expert, Dr. Lenore Walker, intended to testify about the
effects of learned helplessness on the defendant). While this article deals specifically with the
theories of learned helplessness and battered women as survivors, recent psychological studies
indicate the "battered woman syndrome ... encompasses the full spectrum of cognitive,
emotional, behavioral, and physiological reactions to violence." Dutton, supra note 19, at 1197.
Recognition of the problems inherent in trying to get a diverse sampling of women to fit one
theory (be it learned helplessness, the survivor theory, or PTSD) inspired Dr. Dutton's
redefinition of the Battered Woman Syndrome initially. Id. at 1198-1201. For those with an
interest in the latest psychological developments in Battered Woman Syndrome consult Dr.
Dutton's work.
30. See cases cited supra note 29.
31. "[C] ases involving expert testimony on battered woman syndrome resound with the very
sex-stereotypes of female incapacity which women's self-defense work has sought to overcome."
Schneider, supra note 17, at 216 (citing to eleven cases supporting this proposition). "[B]y
emphasizing the helplessness and passivity of the battered woman, and thus explaining why she
was unable to leave her batterer before killing him, expert testimony 'highlights a contradiction
implicit in the message of 'battered woman syndrome'-if the battered woman was so helpless
and passive why did she kill the batterer?'" EWING, supra note 3, at 55-56 (noting that testimony
on the syndrome may "backfire" due to the jury's perception of it as either a mental incapacity
defense or as a "license to kill" theory).
32. Inherent problems include questions along the lines of "if she was so helpless, why did
she kill him?" or "if the violence was so bad, how did she know this time was different and that
her life was in danger?" While answering the question of "why didn't she leave?", learned
helplessness leaves the jury with even more difficult, less intuitive questions.
33. For example, Walker's work itself indicates help-seeking behavior on the part of those
battered women surveyed. Such activity would appear to question the validity of relying solely
on learned helplessness theory to explain battered women's reactions to abuse. See WALKER,
supra note 21, at 26 (noting that "[a]s the violence escalated, so did the probability that the
battered women would seek help; [w]hile only 14% sought help after the first battering incident,
22% did after the second, 31% after one of the worst, and 49% sought help after the last
incident").
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"battered woman as survivors."' 4 Section I compares an assessment
of the statistical "fit" of each theory to the collected data. Principally
drawing from Gondolf and Fisher's research on battered women as
survivors, 5 this article proposes a legal characterization of battered
women which incorporates elements of both learned helplessness and
survivor theories. Section II introduces the Supreme Court's
standard for evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony on
scientific evidence developed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc..37 The article then applies the Daubert standard to Section I's
proposed version of the Battered Woman Syndrome. Section III
briefly examines the effects of analogous theoretical modifications on
courts' acceptance or rejection of scientific theories as appropriate
topics for expert testimony. Section IV briefly identifies and assesses
the anticipated benefits of this proposed shift in the legal definition
of the Battered Woman Syndrome. In conclusion, the article
recommends a shift toward a modified survivor theory as an alterna-
tive theoretical basis for Battered Woman Syndrome.
SECTION I: LEARNED HELPLESSNESS VERSUS BATTERED WOMEN AS
SuRvIVORS: AN EMPIRICAL COMPARISON
Gondolf and Fisher, in Battered Women as Survivors: An Alternative to
Treating Learned Helplessness, examine data from over 6,500 women
who used Texas' shelter facilities within an eighteen month period."
34. See EDWARD W. GONDOLF & ELLEN R. FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS: AN
ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 11 (1988) (contradicting the prevailing
characterization of battered women suffering from learned helplessness).
35. Id. at 105-11 (describing the research methodology of Gondolf and Fisher).
36. Like insanity, the concept of the "Battered Woman Syndrome" is not used in the field
of psychology perse rather, it exists within the intersection of psychology and the law. Interview
with Mary Ann Dutton, Ph.D., Clinical Psychologist, Research Professor of Emergency Violence,
Professorial Lecturer at the National Law Center and Director of the Violence Initiative of
George Washington University, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 12, 1994) [hereinafter "Dutton
Interview"]. While there is a field of study about battered women, domestic violence, and
trauma, all of which, for example, pertain to the Syndrome, there is no single psychological
entity labeled the Battered Woman Syndrome. Id
37. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). See also infra note
93 (discussing the prior standard expressed in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923)).
38. Gondolf and Fisher's results are "based on data drawn from shelter intake and exit
interviews.., of 6,612 ... women who entered the fifty Texas shelters during an eighteen-
month period in 1984-1985." GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 105. For an in-depth
discussion of Gondolf and Fisher's methodology, the sampling group, the preparation and
administration of the interviews, formation of variables, and statistical analysis procedures, see
id. at 105-11.
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In the form of intake and exit interviews, this data tested their
hypotheses about the help-seeking behaviors of battered women. 9
Gondolf and Fisher's research4" indicates women in their study
made an average of five out of eleven positive efforts to stop the
abuse." This average does not include any efforts to secure medical
treatment for injuries, or the shelter visit during which women
completed the survey.4 2 The Gondolf and Fisher results confirm
their hypothesis that battered women actively sought help to stop
their abuse: "[t]he majority of the Texas women (71 [sic] percent)
had previously left home before becoming shelter residents [and] [i] n
63 [sic] percent of the cases, the women had contacted the shelter or
a lawyer; and over half (53 [sic] percent) had called the police at least
once."4" These statistics do not conform with the stereotypical image
of a passive woman who "learned" to be helpless.
During their analysis of the help-seeking behavior of battered
women, Gondolf and Fisher refer the reader to Lee H. Bowker's study
of Milwaukee women who had "beaten wife-beating."' While
39. See CONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 105 (detailing how the women were asked 84
questions about three fundamental areas: their background, history of abuse and help-seeking
activities).
40. Gondolf and Fisher's questionnaire asked the shelter women, "[i n general, immediately
after abusive incidents, what have you done?" See GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 29. The
questionnaire offered 13 different categories of what were viewed as both positive (all except for
items 1 and 2) and negative responses (items 1 and 2): (1) attempted suicide [14% of the
sample women reporting doing so], (2) covered up for the batterer [46%], (3) threatened or
acted violent toward the batterer [35%], (4) left home [71%], (5) called a family member
[47%], (6) called a friend [47%], (7) called a minister or other clergy [17%], (8) called a social
service agency [19%], (9) called a shelter or lawyer [64%], (10) called the police [54%], (11)
visited a social service agency [11%], (12) previously visited a shelter [14%], (13) took legal
action [19%]. Id. at 30. In terms of further analysis, these were also divided into three sub-
categories: personal strategies (items 1-4 listed above), informal help sources (items 5-7), and
formal help sources distinguishing between those sources "called" (items 8-10) and those
"visited" (items 11-13). Id. at 29-30.
41. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 29.
42. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 29. Since 42% of the women sought professional
treatment for their injuries, counting this as a positive help-seeking measure increases the
average to six. Id. Including the current shelter contact during which the interview was
conducted raised the average number to seven. Id. at 30. Also excluded were those strategies
labeled personal (i.e., leaving home or threatening the batterer). Id.
43. GONDOLF & FISHER, sup ra note 34, at 30-31. In their measure of help-seeking, Gondolf
and Fisher "deduce[d] from those measures alone that the shelter women have made assertive
attempts to do something about their abuse." Id. at 30.
44. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 31 (referring to the informal and formal help
sources from Bowker's sample). Bowker relied on a recruiting strategy which included such
tactics as advertisements in major Milwaukee daily, local and student newspapers and newsletters,
as well as radio broadcast public service announcements. LEE H. BOWIER, BEATING WIFE-BEATING
22 (1983). Bowker includes a sample of an advertisement, which reads in part: "Have you
beaten wife-beating? Is this your success story? Experienced wife abuse at sometime in the past?
Even if only once? Or 10-30 years ago? Eliminated the problem from relationship with husband
or partner at least one year ago? Maintained relationship with that husband or partner?" Id. at
23.
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Bowker's study of a self-selected group of formerly battered women
who "solved" their abuse problem did not hypothesize a survivor
theory, Bowker's findings nonetheless support those of Gondolf and
Fisher.45
Bowker's study indicates that the number of women who contacted
other family members about the violence increased from nineteen
percent during the first battering incident to forty-three percent
during the last incident.46 The number of women who indicated
they contacted friends rose from sixteen percent after the first
incident to fifty-two percent after the last incident.4 7 In addition to
identifying informal help-seeking strategies, Bowker also asked the
women to rate the effectiveness of these tactics: contacting family
members rated very successful in three percent of the cases, and fairly
successful in seventy-seven percent;4 8 contacting friends, which
45. Bowker includes a small section on learned helplessness in his book. BOWKER, supra
note 44, at 133. Bowker differentiates his sample (of women who had overcome battering) from
Walker's sample in The Battered Woman (who had not) by noting that they "hardly exemplified
the learned-helplessness syndrome"; he notes that these women experienced learned
helplessness early in their marital relationships. Id. By"triumphing over the battering the women
also reduced or eliminated their feelings of helplessness." Id. Instead of learned helplessness
the women demonstrated "learned competence." Id. Bowker postulates how his findings, in spite
of illuminating numerous help-seeking strategies on the parts of those surveyed, in reality do not
contradict Walker's theory of a passive, subjugated victim. He notes "a high number of
separations ... occurred during the years when the women in the sample were gaining the
necessary strength to demand an end to the battering." Id. at 134. Bowker finds this consistent
since "Walker believes that the first step in ending learned helplessness is to persuade the
battered women (or the batterer) to leave the relationship." Id. at 133-34. Bowker, however,
never explains how these women managed to leave their relationships. To be consistent with
Walker, they would likely have to be "led out" of the relationship-in much the way that dogs
in Seligman's experiments had to be "led out" of their captivity-before they would be able to
unlearn learned helplessness. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (discussing the
Seligman laboratory studies with dogs). If these women left their batterers of their own free
volition, then Bowker's findings are not readily compatible with Walker's. In addition, Bowker
makes several statements throughout his book which appear to directly contradict the theory of
learned helplessness. Namely, he states that the rapid increase in battered women's contacts with
women's groups, during the interim between the first and the last battering incidents, "reflects
the increase in the availability of women's groups in recent years at least as much as changes in
the help-seeking activities of the battered wives." BOWKER, supra note 44, at 95-96. Bowker
further concludes from the data that many battered women actively fight to remove violence
from their lives. Id. at 104. "They did not abandon their personal efforts when they added
informal and formal help-sources, but integrated these into an armada of forces individualized
to be most effective in their own situations." Id.
46. BowKER, supra note 44, at 75 (noting also that this percentage does not include those
who contacted in-laws). Mothers were the most commonly consulted, followed by sisters,
brothers, and then fathers. Id.
47. BOWKER, supra note 44, at 75. Bowker also reported the following statistical increases
in the percentage of women who used (what he defined as) informal help sources, comparing
the number who used the source for the first battering incident to those who were using it by
the last incident: contacting in-laws, from 12% to 16%; contacting neighbors, from 10% to 17%;
contacting shelter services, from 10% to 29%. Id.
48. BOWKER, supra note 44, at 76. These results do not include the 6% who found this
strategy neither successful nor unsuccessful; or the 14% who found it fairly unsuccessful. Id.
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became the most commonly used strategy by the last incident, rated
very successful in three percent of the cases and fairly successful in
eighty-one percent.
49
Bowker also examined strategies he deemed formal help-seeking:
contact with police, social service agencies, lawyers and district
attorneys, clergy, and women's groups (labeled by Bowker as "semi-
formal") .5 Formal help-seeking contact increased between the first
battering incident and the last. Contact with police increased from
nine percent to thirty-four percent;51 contact with social service
agencies increased from seven percent to forty-three percent; contact
with lawyers and district attorneys increased from six percent to forty-
nine percent; contact with clergy increased from eight percent to
fifteen percent; and contact with women's groups increased from one
percent to thirty-six percent. 2  Again, women rated the success or
failure of these contacts. 3
Bowker concluded from the data that battered women are not
passive, but make efforts to end the abuse by exploring the various
help-sources; he labeled the women's efforts as "extensive and
49. BOWICER, supra note 44, at 79-80. Seven percent judged it neither successful nor
unsuccessful, nine percent as fairly unsuccessful, and one percent as very unsuccessful. Id. In
objectively evaluating these self-reported success ratings, remember that these women escaped
their violent situations. A successful escape was likely to be highly correlated with the outcome
of the woman's help-seeking strategies.
50. Bowker defined formal help-sources as those which the community officially sanctioned.
BOWKER, supra note 44, at 87. "They have a stable organizational structure, specified resources
and services, and either legal or moral power to persuade individuals to take them seriously."
Id. There are slight variations in Bowker's and Gondolf and Fisher's classification of sources as
formal versus informal. See GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 29-30 (classifying clergy as
informal and contact with shelter services as formal, for example).
51. BOWiCER, supra note 44, at 87. This figure was even higher for the worst battering
incident, with 38% of those surveyed contacting the police. Id.
52. BOWICER, supra note 44, at 87-96. Bowker detailed the range of services provided by the
formal help-seeking contacts. The police provided a wide-range of services from arresting the
husband, moving the wife to safety or assisting her to seek medical treatment, to counseling the
wife with legal advice or counseling the husband regarding his behavior. Id. at 88. Social service
agencies focus on talking. Id. at 90. Lawyers and district attorneys handled divorces, assault
charges, restraining orders and separations. Id. at 91. The clergy's focus was also on talking and
problem solving. Id. at 94. The service provided by the women's groups was "modeling-other
battered women counsel others on how to be 'victors instead of victims.'" Id. at 96.
53. The police were ranked by those who contacted them as "very successful in one percent
of the incidents, fairly successful in 33 percent [sic], neither successful nor unsuccessful in 33
percent [sic], fairly unsuccessful in 30 percent [sic], and very unsuccessful in 3 percent [sic]."
BOWKER, supra note 44, at 89. Contact with social service agencies was evaluated as "very
successful in two percent of the cases, fairly successful in 57 percent [sic], neither successful nor
unsuccessful in 22 percent [sic], fairly unsuccessful in 17 percent [sic], and very unsuccessful
in 2 percent [sic]." Id at 90. Contact with attorneys was judged very successful by 9%, fairly
successful 50%, neither 21%, fairly unsuccessful 19% and less than 1% rated it as very
unsuccessful. Id. at 91-92. Ratings for clergy were very successful in 2% of the cases, fairly
successful in 53%, neither in 22%, fairly unsuccessful in 22%, and very unsuccessful in 2%. Id.
at 94.
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intensive." 4 This finding convincingly supports Gondolf and Fisher's
hypothesis that the survivor theory more accurately reflects what
actually occurs in the experiences of most battered women than the
learned helplessness theory.5 In addition to Gondolf and Fisher,
other studies, including Pagelow,56 and Gelles and Straus, 7 suggest
that learned helplessness is "another 'woozle'-that is, a notion
accepted as basic truth but based on common usage rather than
empirical fact."58  What is particularly persuasive is that Walker
herself in The Battered Woman Syndrome observed a concurrent increase
in battered women's help-seeking activities as the violence intensi-
fied.59 These statistics conflict with Walker's advancement of learned
helplessness as a primary symptom of battered women.
The majority of empirical evidence examining the help-seeking
strategies of battered women conclusively supports the survivor theory
as most consistent with their experiences.6" The evidence supporting
help-seeking techniques by abused women makes learned helplessness
less viable in explaining the behavior of battered women. Therefore,
it is appropriate to examine the survivor theory to achieve the goal of
developing a more robust theoretical basis for the Battered Woman
Syndrome.
54. BOWKER, supra note 44, at 104. Bowker explained how the women combined different
strategies of help-seeking including personal efforts and informal and formal help sources. Id.
55. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 16. This is not intended to imply that battered
women do not feel helpless at any point in their relationships. Id. In fact, many women appear
to feel powerless to change their circumstances at some point and yet at another point in time
may actively try to escape their abusers. Id. Statistics indicate that a particularly violent episode,
or a change in the nature of violence-from exclusively physical to sexual, or threats to harm,
or actual harm, to children-often leads to a flurry of help-seeking in spite of previous feelings
of futility. Id. at 16-18.
56. See GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 18 (explaining that studies by Pagelow indicate
"quantitatively that the help-seeking efforts of battered women are substantial"). See also MILDRED
D. PAGELOW, WOMAN-BATTERING: VICTIMS AND THEIR EXPERIENCES 138-39 (1981) (indicating in
spite of low response rates on questions related to help-seeking, of the 155 women who
responded, 99 sought help from psychiatrists or psychologists, 78 consulted clergy and 51 went
to marriage counselors).
57. See RICHARDJ. GELLES & MURRAYA. STRAUS, INTIMATE VIOLENCE: THE DEFINITIVE STUDY
OF THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OFABUSE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 156 (1988) (finding"little
evidence of battered women suffering from learned helplessness"). "Overall, the greater the
violence, the more active women are in seeking help." Id.
58. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 28 (citing Walter R. Schrumm, MicbaelJ. Martin,
Stephan R. Bolman, and Anthony P.Jurich, ClassifyingFamily Violence: Wither the Woozle, 3J. FAM.
ISSUES 319, 319 (1982) (suggesting "a 'woozle effect' may be operating in which frequent
citations of relatively poor studies mislead us into thinking we know more about the causes of
family violence than we really do")); see also GELLES & STRAUS, supra note 57, at 39-51 (discussing
the various "woozles" present in the study of domestic violence).
59. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (indicating a steady increase in the number
of women seeking help as the number of abusive incidents increased).
60. See supra notes 40, 47 and accompanying text (describing various help-seeking behaviors
detected in battered women studies).
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Gondolf and Fisher, prior to their analysis of the data, hypothe-
sized and contrasted elements of the survivor theory with elements of
the learned helplessness theory. It is helpful to reproduce these two
models in full here.
The elements of learned helplessness include:
1. Severe abuse fosters a sense of helplessness in the victim.
Abuse as a child and the neglect of help sources intensif[y]
this helplessness. The battered woman is consequently
severely victimized.
2. The victim experiences low self-esteem, self-blame, guilt, and
depression. The only way to feel some sense of control over
what is otherwise an unpredictable environment is to think
that 'if I change my ways, things will get better.' But the
abuse continues.
3. The victim eventually becomes psychologically paralyzed.
She fails to seek help for herself and may even appear
passive before the beatings. When she does contact a help
source, she is very tentative about receiving help and is likely
to return to the batterer despite advice or opportunity to
leave.
4. This vulnerability and indecisiveness prolongs the violence
and may contribute to its intensification. Some observers
argue that this tendency may reflect an underlying masoch-
ism in the battered woman. The woman may feel that she
deserves to be beaten and accepts it as a fulfillment of her
expectations.
In contrast, elements of the survivor theory include:
1. Severe abuse prompts innovative coping strategies from
battered women and efforts to seek help. Previous abuse
and neglect by help sources lead women to try other help
sources and strategies to lessen the abuse. The battered
woman, in this light, is a 'survivor.'
2. The survivor may experience anxiety or uncertainty over the
prospects of leaving the batterer. The lack of options, know-
how, and finances raise fears about trying to escape the
batterer. The battered woman may therefore attempt to
change the batterer instead of attempting to leave.
3. The survivor actively seeks help from a variety of informal
and formal help sources. There is most often inadequate or
61. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 12. Number five under Gondolf & Fisher's chart
of learned helplessness recommends counseling to treat low self-esteem, depression, and
masochism. Id. For comparison, see Walker's description of behaviors consistent with learned
helplessness. WALKER, supra note 21, at 9-10, 33, 87-89, 100 (describing the concepts of learned
helplessness and adapting the theory to women in a battering relationship).
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piecemeal help-giving that leaves the woman little alternative
but to return to the batterer. The help-seeking continues,
however.
4. The failure of help sources to intervene in a comprehensive
and decisive fashion allows abuse to continue and escalate.
The inadequacy of help sources may be attributed to a kind
of learned helplessness experienced in many community
services. Service providers feel too overwhelmed and limited
in their resources to be effective and therefore do not try as
hard as they might. 2
At first glance, these two theories appear diametrically opposed.
One defines battered women as passive "victims";6' the other
perceives them as "active survivors."'  Although the learned helpless-
ness model mentions the possibility of help-seeking activities by
battered women, these acts are described as "tentative."6  In
contrast, the survivor theory offers numerous and varied help-seeking
behaviors as proof of its hypothesis that battered women do not
submissively accept their abused status, but instead make quite
determined attempts to escape or at least change their predica-
ments.6 6
Upon closer examination of both models, however, several elements
convey essentially the same responses to violence. For example,
elements one through three describe very similar activities on the
battered woman's part; the difference occurs in how the acts are
characterized.6 7  Specifically, element one of leamed helplessness
states that "[a]buse as a child and the neglect of help sources
62. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 12. Number five under the survivor theory stresses
the need for resources to enable battered women to escape. Id.
63. Se WALKER, supra note 21, at 33 (finding that "the activity level of women after the first
abusive incident shows a decrease"). She determines these results to be "consistent with the
learned helplessness theory in that [the women] took this action without any belief that it would
contingently stop the battering." Id. Walker interprets the women's behavior as "a basic coping
mechanism much like Seligman's dogs, . . . who used passivity... to stay alive." Id. The dogs
and battered women failed to "develop adequate escape skills." Id. To the outside world, the
battered woman's focus on surviving the abuse, rather than escaping, appears to be an example
of passive victimization.
64. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 17 (noting that the survivor hypothesis offers
"[tihe alternative characterization of battered women ... [as] active survivors rather than
helpless victims").
65. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 12 (referencing number three on the learned
helplessness portion of the comparison chart).
66. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 18. "We offer, therefore, a survivor hypothesis that
contradicts the assumptions of learned helplessness: [b]attered women increase their
helpseeking in the face of increased violence, rather than decrease heipseeking as learned
helplessness." Id. at 17-18. The battered woman's "effort to survive transcends even fearsome
danger, depression or guilt and economic constraints ... [thus] [iln this effort to survive,
battered women are, in fact, heroically assertive and persistent." Id. at 18.
67. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
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intensif[y]" the battered woman's sense of helplessness; in contrast,
element one of the survivor theory perceives "[p] revious abuse and
neglect by help sources lead women to try other help sources and
strategies to lessen the abuse."6 Also, both elements deal with
previous abuse as possible factors in the woman's reaction to her
situation,69 and both identify problems of "neglect by help sourc-
es.
70
Element two seems strikingly similar in both models in that the
women experience feelings alternately described as either "low self-
esteem, self-blame, guilt and depression" or "anxiety or uncertain-
ty.,'71 Low self-esteem is similar to anxiety in terms of its possible
physical manifestation as an indecisive or unsure act by the battered
woman; analogous arguments hold true for the other qualities and
conditions described.7 2  Both theories expect the woman to try to
change her partner's behavior instead of ending the relationship. 3
Finally, element three further illustrates the similarity of the
women's physical act of contacting help sources by the learned
helplessness and survivor theory models. Regardless of the character-
ization in the help-seeking model as "tentative" by the proponents of
learned helplessness, and the characterization as "active" by survivor
theoreticians, 74 the end result is the same-the woman stays with the
batterer.75
68. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 12 (referring to the "Comparison of Learned
Helplessness and Survivor Hypothesis" table). "[Situdies have suggested that learned help-
lessness may be rooted in childhood exposure to violence." Id. at 14; see also supra notes 61-62
and accompanying text.
69. In their results, Gondolf and Fisher discovered the insertion of a "previous abuse"
variable did not significantly affect the fit of the data to their survivor model. GONDOLF &
FISHER, supra note 34, at 36. See also PAGELOW, supra note 56, at 172 (showing how correlations
between abuse as a child and tolerance for violence as an adult are negative and instead those
who were abused as children tended to end their marriages earlier).
70. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. See also GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34,
at 17 (explaining that "battered women remain in abusive situations not because they have been
passive, but because they have tried to escape with no avail").
71. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
72. The contention that someone is experiencing self-blame, guilt and depression would
reasonably lead to uncertainty on her part in terms of life-altering decisions such as deciding
to leave a spouse. It appears to be a "which came first" scenario where it is unclear whether the
uncertainty is due to the blame, guilt and depression, or the blame, guilt and depression are due
to the uncertainty. See GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 22.
73. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 12 (stating the learned helplessness theory focuses
on the woman changing her behavior to stop her partner's abuse, and the survivor theory
focuses on the woman trying to change the batterer's behavior, in both instances the woman
stays with the batterer while trying to control her partner's behavior).
74. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 12 (stating that under element three of learned
helplessness the victim is "psychologically paralyzed," thus if help is sought it is often tentative,
but under element three of the survivor theory the woman actively seeks help).
75. See GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 12 (explaining that the woman stays with the
batterer under the learned helplessness theory because she is tentative about receiving help; and
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At element four the theories sharply diverge. Learned helplessness
focuses on the woman's inability to escape her situation, and her
passive acceptance of abuse.76 The survivor theory focuses on the
woman's substantial efforts, both informally and formally, to escape
her abuse, and society's inability to assist her in doing so. 7 Inaction,
within the learned helplessness model, is perceived as a reasonable
reaction by the battered woman since she has learned that efforts to
escape her batterer are futile.78  This may often be the case where
violence becomes neither more nor less severe, and the woman
devotes her attention to surviving the abuse rather than escaping it.79
In contrast, the survivor theory views the woman as a victim not
only of her partner, but also of society's refusal to assist her in
meaningful ways.8" While inaction would be reasonable in the face
of such overwhelming odds against escape, the survivor theory points
out that inaction is often not what occurs. The battered woman
continues to seek escape routes while continually encountering an
ineffective bureaucracy, insufficient help sources, and societal
indifference." A woman previously exhibiting learned helplessness
may become galvanized into action given a shift in the degree or
nature of the violence,82 and make renewed efforts to seek help.
Another woman may continue her help-seeking efforts throughout.
In light of the similarity of both theories, rather than risk exchang-
ing one stereotypical image of battered women for another, which
in the survivor theory, the woman stays with the batterer, because although she actively seeks
help, the help received is inadequate).
76. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 14 (explaining that under learned helplessness
some victims begin to feel they do not deserve better, consequently making it easier to accept
their partner's abuse).
77. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 12 (describing that at this point in the learned
helplessness model the woman feels she "deserves to be beaten and accepts it"; at this point in
the survivor theory the failure of adequate help sources contributes to the continued abuse).
78. Dr. Dutton, in her interview, explained that it is useful to take the usual question "why
didn't she leave?" and re-phrase it into a two-part inquiry "what did she do and what happened
when she did it?" Dutton Interview, supra note 36. Once it becomes known what steps she
took-tried to leave several times-and what happened as a result of that action-separation
violence, threats against her parents or children, an escalation of harassment, or threats of
future serious harm-it often becomes clear why she did or did not act a certain way. Id.
79. See WALKER, supra note 21, at 33 (noting that survival skills may be developed at the
expense of escape skills).
80. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 37 (asserting that "this survivor model implies
more of a 'system failure' than a failure on the part of battered women"). In addition, when
violence escalates without any intervening response from the rest of the world, the woman
"learns" to attempt avoiding, rather than escaping, the violence. See infra note 87 (explaining
the phenomena of social learning and assimilation).
81. See GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 37 (observing the failure of help sources to
stop abuse or provide safety).
82. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (explaining that women may exhibit learned
helplessness, yet seek help at other times).
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may prove equally limiting in the future, 3 the common elements are
fused. Combining the similar ingredients of elements one through
three, 4 with the dissimilar components of the survivor theory's
elements four and five,85 results in an adapted theory which better
reflects reality. The goal of this combination is to gain a more
flexible definition of the battered woman. An immediately apparent
advantage to such a synthesis is the resulting theory's inherently
broader application to victims of domestic violence. Thus, regardless
of the particular stage of an individual battered woman's abuse at the
time she is forced to defend her life, she will nevertheless have the
alternative of presenting expert testimony on Battered Woman
Syndrome.
The revised theory, which will be referred to as the survivor theory
II, includes the following elements:
1. Severe abuse typically is met by informal help-seeking strategies
on the part of the battered woman. Attempts are often made
by the woman to change her behavior with the hope of
stopping the abuse.
2. As her predicament worsens, the woman may experience a
wide spectrum of feelings including low self-esteem, self-blame,
guilt, depression, and anxiety. She is usually uncertain about
how to remedy the situation. A lack of options and resources
may lead her to feel as though she is incapable of escaping. At
this stage, a woman may use personal strategies to try to change
the batterer or continue to adapt her own behavior in an
attempt to avoid the abuse.
3. The woman actively begins to seek help not only from informal
help sources, but also from formal help sources. Despite her
efforts, the general disinterest of society in her predicament
coupled with inadequate resources routinely force her to
return to her batterer. The battered woman's help-seeking
behavior continues.
4. The failure of society to provide the woman with a viable
alternative and society's lack of active intervention on her
behalf allow the abuse to continue and often to escalate.86 As
83. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (noting the difficulty of fitting battered women
into one theory).
84. See supra notes 61-62, 67-75 and accompanying text (illustrating the similarities between
the first three elements of the survivor theory and learned helplessness).
85. See supranotes 76-81 and accompanying text (contrasting the fourth elements of the two
theories).
86. See GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 12. See also supra note 80 and accompanying
text.
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part of a "social learning" process, the woman becomes acutely
aware of certain verbal and non-verbal "cues" from her batterer
which typically precede abuse. As such, the woman may
respond to certain behavior by her partner in a way that is
incomprehensible and unreasonable to others, at least until the
basis for her response is thoroughly explained. Only after the
battered woman's behavior is put into context does it become
reasonable.
Aimed with the survivor theory II, the next section examines
potential evidentiary problems that might arise from a shift in the
underlying theory of the Battered Woman Syndrome. Once a
prediction has been made of the judicial system's response to an
amended Battered Woman Syndrome, it will become clearer whether
such a change should be advocated.
SECTION II: APPLICATION OF THE DAUBERT STANDARD TO THE
SURVIVOR THEORY II VERSION OF THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
Today, expert testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome is admissi-
ble in the majority ofjurisdictions 8 Historically, however, the fight
to gain admission of Battered Woman Syndrome testimony in battered
women's self-defense cases was not easy. 9 Courts generally cited one
or more of the following reasons for refusing admission: "(1) the
syndrome [was] not sufficiently well established within the scientific
community... to make it the subject of expert testimony; (2) such
87. Dr. Dutton explains that one of the essential theories to understanding the behavior
of battered women is the concept of "social learning," which describes the basic way people
learn and assimilate information. Dutton Interview, supra note 36. For example, if every time it
becomes dark and cloudy during the daytime, it rains, then humans begin to anticipate and
expect it to rain when it's dark and cloudy and will change their behavior accordingly (say, by
bringing their umbrellas). Id. The same process occurs when batterers exhibit certain verbal and
non-verbal "cues" prior to a battering incident. Id. Just as with non-violent relationships, the
woman begins to develop an increased sensitivity to the batterer's cues indicating, for example,
mood and level of dangerousness. Id. Except, instead of realizing her partner had a bad day
because he walked in the door without speaking to anyone, the battered woman may anticipate
a beating because he raised his voice, or his face was distorted into a certain expression, or any
number of other signals an average person would not recognize as precursors to abuse. Id. The
battered woman, however, because of her past exposure to his behavior, has learned to read his
cues, anticipate violence, and perhaps take steps to avoid it. Dutton Interview, supra note 36.
88. See generally Coffee, supra note 29, at 396 (concluding the "trend in the admissibility of
expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome appears to be in the direction of
admissibility").
89. Dr. Walker's most recent volume on battered women, Terifying Love, offers a window
into her personal experiences and frequent frustrations in trying to gain admission for expert
testimony on the Syndrome. See generally WALKER, supra note 27. As one of the pre-eminent
scholars on Battered Woman Syndrome, if Walker encountered hostile judges and inflexible
evidentiary standards, then undoubtedly other advocates have experienced similar, if not more
formidable, evidentiary difficulties. See also infra note 90.
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testimony ... invade[d] the province of the jury; and (3) the
probative value of such testimony [was] outweighed by its prejudicial
impact on the jury."9"
Neither arguments two nor three advanced by the courts should be
affected by a change in the Battered Woman Syndrome's underlying
theory. A shift to survivor theory II would have no effect on what is
defined as the province of the jury. Further, the shift would have no
impact on either the testimony's probative value or its prejudicial
effects. Thus, the Battered Woman Syndrome based on survivor
theory II, as compared to a version based exclusively on learned
helplessness, should be no more difficult for courts to accept.
Potential problems with argument one, however, require a more in-
depth analysis in light of the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc..
91
The Federal Rules of Evidence allow expert testimony to be offered
where the expertise of the witness will enhance the jury's ability to
comprehend the evidence or decide a fact in issue.92 After passing
the threshold requirement of enhancing comprehension, expert
testimony on a subject was previously allowed when its methodology
had achieved "general acceptance in the particular field to which it
belong[ed]. 93 Recently, however, the Supreme Court declined to
affirm this "generally accepted" test and instead relied on the Rules to
develop its own test for admissibility in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
90. See EWING, supra note 3, at 54 (citing State v. Thomas, 423 N.E.2d 137, 139 (Ohio 1981)
(excluding the proffered expert testimony on the Battered Woman Syndrome because it was not
generally accepted by the scientific community and also because its prejudicial harm outweighed
its probative value)); Fielder v. State 683 S.W.2d 565, 594 (Tex. App. 1985) (excluding expert
testimony because of its prejudicial effect); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Wyo. 1981)
(excluding the victim's expert testimony because of insufficient scientific acceptance); State v.
Griffiths, 610 P.2d 522, 524 (Idaho 1980) (excluding testimony because it would invade the
province of the jury).
91. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (clarifying the
admissibility standard for expert testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also infra
note 93 (presenting the standard that preceded Daubert).
92. FED. R. EVID. 702 (specifying the standard for admissibility of expert testimony as
whether the "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise").
93. Prior to Dauber4 the Frye test was considered the majority rule for determining
admissibility of expert testimony. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)
(rejecting testimony on systolic blood pressure deception test and establishing the Frye
test-based on whether the scientific procedure "ha[s] gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs"--to determine admissibility). Fye was rejected by the Court
as the exclusive test of expert testimony admissibility in Dauber, 113 S. Ct. at 2794 (noting an
"assertion that the Rules somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing.... That austere standard,
absent from and incompatible with the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in
federal trials.").
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Pharmaceuticals, Inc..94 In Daubert, the Court announced a dual prong
test of reliability and relevancy.95 As part of the Court's reliability
prong, Daubert requires that the subject meet the definition of
"scientific knowledge."96 The Court notes that "'scientific' implies
a grounding in the methods and procedures of science, and similarly,
the word 'knowledge' connotes more than the subjective belief or
unsupported speculation."97 The Court suggests this prong can be
met by determining whether the theory can be, and has been,
tested. 8 The Court recognizes several factors which might be
considered when making this determination: submission to peer
review and publication,99 the rate of error, and the existence, and
maintenance of operating standards. 100 In addition, the Court
recognizes the Frye test's general acceptance within the scientific
community as another possible factor to be examined in determining
admissibility. 1'
After determining the reliability of expert testimony,02 the focus
shifts to relevancy."0 3 Daubert informs us that the proper question
to be asked is broader than simply whether the theory is generally
accepted within its scientific community.'0 4 The inquiry under
94. Dauber 113 S. Ct. at 2786; see infra note 95 for a discussion of the applicable Federal
Rules of Evidence.
95. Id. at 2796-97. In asserting that the restrictions of reliability and relevancy applied, the
Court refers to several Federal Rules of Evidence in its analysis: FED. tL EVID. 104(a) (dealing
with the question of admissibility in general); 401 (noting relevance turns on whether the
evidence tends to make the existence of a material fact in question more or less probable); 403
(permitting the exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice); and 700 et. seq. (dealing specifically with expert
testimony). Id.
96. Id. at 2795 (discussing the definitions of scientific and knowledge that indicate the
connection to the necessity of reliability in this test).
97. Daubertv. Merrell DowPharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786,2795 (1993) (recognizing
that scientific testimony does not need to be "'known' to a certainty; arguably, there are no
certainties in science").
98. Id. at 2795 (explaining that "to qualify as 'scientific knowledge' an inference or assertion
must be derived by the scientific method."). "Proposed testimony must be supported by
appropriate validation-i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is known." Id.
99. Id. at 2797 (stating that publication in a peer reviewed journal is relevant but not
dispositive in assessing scientific validity).
100. Id. (explaining that these factors are considerations for the court, which are especially
applicable to particular scientific techniques, and the Court uses spectrographic voice
identification as an example of one such technique).
101. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2797 (1993) (clarifying
that general acceptance has a "bearing on the inquiry").
102. SeeDaubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
103. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing the ways in which Battered Woman
Syndrome is relevant to a battered woman's self-defense plea).
104. Dauber4 in contrast to the earlier majority Frye test by which the Syndrome was
previously assessed, indicates that other factors, in addition to general acceptability, are to be
examined when making admissibility determinations. Seesupra note 101 and accompanying text.
Fall 1994] RE-DEFINING BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 137
Daubert is flexible, focusing on principles and methodology rather
than conclusions.10 5
Applying the Supreme Court's framework set out in Daubert, the
Battered Woman Syndrome, premised on survivor theory II, will be
examined. Numerous surveys and published studies reveal help-
seeking behavior by battered women.'0 6 Empirical evidence sup-
porting survivor theory II occurs in those studies specifically testing
the "battered women as survivors" hypothesis,0 7 and also in those
which ostensibly test for and find learned helplessness.10 8 As such,
researchers testing for learned helplessness discovered recurrent and
varied help-seeking behavior on the part of their subjects. The
researchers were not looking for such behavior, which further bolsters
the procedural credibility of the evidence. 9 Thus, it is actually
through the peer review and publication process explicitly sanctioned
by the Court that learned helplessness was originally questioned and
the survivor theory was offered as a more realistic model. Since the
methodology and principles underlying studies on the Battered
Woman Syndrome remain consistent, different researchers reaching
different conclusions should not impact on its admissibility.
It is difficult to imagine the Court disqualifying evidence on a topic
merely because an underlying tenet's revision more accurately reflects
statistical findings on the subject.110 Such a revision is exactly the
practice that should be, and has been, encouraged by the Court. The
survivor theory was effectively submitted to peer review and publica-
tion and fulfills that component of the Daubert guidelines. 1 '
105. Dauber, 113 S. Ct. at 2797 (clarifying that the inquiry is the "scientific validity-and thus
the evidentiary relevance and reliability-of the principles that underlie a proposed
submission").
106. See supra notes 40-60 and accompanying text.
107. See BOWICER, supra note 44, at 133-34 (indicating the Milwaukee study showed battered
women can change an expectancy to fail through informal avenues such as families, friends and
women's support groups); GELLES & STRAUS, supra note 57, at 156-59 (summarizing the results
reached by a 1985 National Family Violence Survey indicating that of nearly 3,000 women victims
the probability of the victim seeking informal sources of help increased as the level of violence
increased); GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 18 (referring to several empirical works which
indicated that battered women could not be distinguished by symptoms of learned helplessness);
PAGELOW, supra note 56, at 221 (noting that the development of shelters make it more feasible
for a battered woman to leave her spouse).
108. See BOWEER, supra note 44, at 133 (describing how the Milwaukee survey results showed
battered women who "exhibited learned competence instead of learned helplessness"); GELLES
& STRAUS, supra note 57, at 159 (concluding that the results from studies do not support that
battered women, in general, suffer from learned helplessness, but indicate that not all sources
of help may be available, or those which are may not be effective).
109. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
110. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2797 (1993) (directing
judges to "focus ... solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they
generate").
111. See supra notes 40-60 and accompanying text.
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Two other factors mentioned by the Court include the known rates
of error and the existence of standards controlling the technique's
operation.11 2 In general, these factors appear less measurable with
Syndrome testimony, due in part to its "soft" nature.11 3 Thus, key
issues to address before proceeding are: how courts have traditionally
dealt with expert testimony on behavioral sciences; whether they use
the same test for both "hard""4 and soft sciences; and how reliabili-
ty can be tested. Several cases provide an impression of how these
issues have been handled under Frye.
The Washington Supreme Court recently addressed these issues
in State v. Riker, a case examining the admissibility of Battered Woman
Syndrome to explain the defendant's criminal activities occurring
outside of a battering relationship." 5 In its analysis, the court
confirmed that the admission of scientific testimony involved two
related inquiries: whether the theory passed the general acceptance
standard in Frye;, and whether the expert testimony is properly
admissible under Evidence Rule 702.16 Discussing the Frye inquiry,
the court again divides its analysis into two parts, one testing general
acceptance in the relevant scientific community, and a second
investigating whether the methods depended on by the theory
produce reliable, generally accepted results." 7 While the court held
that the evidence insufficiently supported the use of Battered Woman
Syndrome to explain actions taken outside of the battering relation-
ship,"' it subjected this soft scientific testimony to the same test
112. Dauber, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
113. 'Soft' scientific evidence refers to nontraditional psychological evidence in the
form of behavioral science testimony, or opinion testimony normally given in court by
social workers, psychologists, and psychiatrists. 'Soft' scientific evidence as related to
syndromes is almost always offered in the form of expert testimony. As opinion, such
evidence is usually subjective, and thus, not capable of being scientifically verified.
Charles Bleil, Evidence of Syndromes: No Need for a "Better Mousetrap," 32 S. TEX. L. REV. 37, 40
(1990) (footnotes omitted).
Use of the term "soft" will be used to refer to evidence of syndromes, which typically consists
of an expert's opinion.
114. "Hard" scientifir evidence generally refers to the use of objective testing devices which
provide quantifiable results. Bleil, supra note 113, at 40.
115. State v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43, 46 (Wash. 1994) (explaining the defendant's theory as one
in which her previous history of abuse "affected her ability to resist the alleged coercion" to
engage in criminal activity).
116. Id. at 47; see also supra note 92.
117. Riker, 869 P.2d at 47 (indicating the theory does not have to be correct, only generally
accepted).
118. Id. at 49-50 (finding the extension of the principles and the use of testimony on the
Syndrome as described "has not yet achieved the general scientific acceptance necessary under
Fqd').
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used for hard sciences.119 The court further appeared to equate
reliability with general acceptance rather than treating it as a separate
issue.
20
The Ohio Court of Appeals addressed analogous issues in State v.
Martens as it examined the admissibility of Rape Trauma Syn-
drome.12 1 In addition to the usual criteria for evidence, 122 the
court explained that the theory underlying the expert opinion must
be commonly accepted by the scientific community before the
testimony would be admitted. 23  Again, this court basically applied
the Frye test even though it dealt with a soft science, and subsumed
any question of reliability into its general acceptance test.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico arrived at a similar conclusion
in State v. Alberico.'24 The court, adopting Daubert, stated: "the focus
should ... be on the validity and the soundness of the scientific
method used to generate the evidence." 125 As part of its analysis,
the court relied on the DSM III-R1 26 as an indicator of a theory's
"general acceptance in psychology [and] expos[ure] to objective
scientific scrutiny and empirical verification." 27 The decision treats
119. State v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43,49-50 (Wash. 1994) (finding the Battered Woman Syndrome
insufficiently scientifically tested to explain behavior outside of the battering relationship). The
Washington Court of Appeals also recently examined the use of expert testimony as related to
general behavioral characteristics of sexually abused children. State v. Jones, 863 P.2d 85, 98
(Wash. Ct. App. 1993). In determining admissibility, the court recognized that "when personal
experience is used as a basis for generalized statements regarding the behavior of [a class of
victims], the testimony crosses over to scientific testimony regarding a profile or syndrome...
and therefore should be subject to the standard set forth in Frye." Id. at 97. The court observed
that although some courts have allowed this kind of testimony without consideration of the
scientific reliability, "where the concern is reliability of novel forms of evidence-it is appropriate
to characterize all of the relevant disciplines as scientific [thus] acknowledg[ing] the scientific
element of expert medical and behavioral science testimony." Id. at 97 n.8. The court also
pointed out that, although Washington still adhered to the Frye test despite the difficulties
presented when it is applied to general behavioral testimony, the Supreme Court's new Daubert
test adopts a less rigid standard. Id. at 98 n.10.
120. State v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43, 50 (Wash. 1994) ("Without studies documenting the effect
... prior battering relationships will have on a person's functions ... the expert's opinion
amounts to no more than an unsupported guess.").
121. State v. Martens, 629 N.E.2d 462, 466 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
122. Under case law of Ohio, permissible expert testimony must be relevant, beyond the
understanding of thejury, and more probative than prejudicial. Id. (citing Ohio v. Thomas, 423
N.E.2d 137 (Ohio 1981)).
123. Martens, 629 N.E.2d at 466-67.
124. State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 203 (N.M. 1993) (rejecting the Fye test but concluding
"[v]alidity is the measure for determining whether the testimony is grounded in or a function
of established scientific methods" and explaining further that validity and reliability are
scientifically interrelated).
125. Id. at 203-04.
126. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS III (rev. 1987) (referring to the main collection of published criteria commonly used
in diagnosing various mental disorders within the medical field).
127. Alberico, 861 P.2d at 208. But seeState v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1125 (La. 1993) (noting
that opinion testimony falls the Frye portion of the Daubert test because "psychodynamic theories
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the admissibility of opinion testimony on psychological findings as
part of the same inquiry of scientific evidence in general, indicating
that for almost seventy-five years the admissibility of expert testimony
has relied on the Frye test.128 The court in part relies on the DSM
III-R's acceptance of the theory as an assurance of both its reliability
and its adherence to scientific standards.
Historically, many states required psychological evidence to meet
the standards set forth in Frye.'29  The inherent difficulties in
determining rates of error for soft sciences were not of sufficient
magnitude to exclude the testimony.3' Regardless of whether an
individual court uses the Frye test or the Daubert test, lack of data
concerning the rate of error historically has not precluded admissibili-
ty of soft sciences" ' and currently should not preclude admission
of expert testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome. In addition,
inquiries into standards governing "technique" are reflected in
methodology considerations. 132  The scientific standards governing
empirical research in general also govern those examining Battered
Woman Syndrome.'33 Therefore, regardless of a dearth of informa-
on the explanation of human behavior is, at best, a science that is difficult to impossible to test
for accuracy. This untestability comes from its very nature as an opinion as to the causes of
human behavior, and the fact that the methods for testing the results of psychoanalysis are rife
with the potential for inaccuracy."). The court decided with this theory that a determination of
whether the validity of a technique is sufficient for admissibility could not be conclusively
answered. Id. In addition, as part of its analysis of the "known or potential rate of error," the
court was reluctant to rely primarily on one of the few studies testing the accuracy of behaviors
indicating child sexual abuse, which exhibited a "32% margin of error." Id. at 1125-26. See
generally Coffee, supra note 29 (discussing the treatment of battered women in Louisiana and
several other states).
128. State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 194 (N.M. 1993).
129. See, e.g., Stokes v. State, 548 So. 2d 188, 195 (Fla. 1989) (explaining that after
"consideration of the approaches to this problem, we believe that the test espoused in Frye
properly addresses the issue of admissibility of posthypnotic testimony"); Hill v. State, 507 So.
2d 554, 555 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (adhering to the Frye general acceptance principle for
scientific and medical expert testimony); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 436 A.2d 170, 172 (Pa.
1981) (reaffirming that scientific evidence must meet the standards established in Frye, "which
is generally accepted by manyjurisdictions, including our own"); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764,
768 (Minn. 1980) (concluding that "[u] nder the Frye rule, the results of mechanical or scientific
testing are not admissible unless the testing has developed or improved to the point where
experts in the field widely share the view that the results are scientifically reliable as accurate").
130. See supra notes 115-28 (demonstrating that these courts relied on the Frye general
acceptance test rather than a strict reliability standard).
131. See supra notes 115-28 (illustrating that even in those instances where soft sciences were
excluded, the rate of error was not cited as a separate reason for exclusion).
132. The court in Alberico addresses the issue of standards in its discussion of how the
psychological process works. State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 209 (N.M. 1993). Specifically,
psychological diagnosis is no different from other methods or techniques; the psychologist
compares symptoms with known reactions and attempts to correlate the victim's symptoms with
the categorized known causes of behavioral patterns. Id.
133. See BOWKER, supra note 44, at 19-29, 35-38 (describing the standards for research used
to conduct the Milwaukee study); GELLES & STRAUS, supra note 57, at 207-12 (discussing the
methodologies of each survey and the strengths and weaknesses of the chosen techniques);
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tion about rates of error or standards controlling the scientific
technique, a valid empirical methodology should create a presump-
tion in favor of the amended Syndrome's admissibility.
Finally, the remaining factor to examine is the Frye "general
acceptance" test. Again, while the survivor theory II may not be
present by name in the majority of the literature discussing the
Battered Woman Syndrome, it is repeatedly present statistically.'34
Evidence confirms the presence of battered women who exhibit both
learned helplessness and survivor behavior depending on their
individual circumstances, at what stage they are in their relationships,
and other factors, such as prior experience with abuse." 5 Daubert
specifically notes no consensus is needed among conclusions, merely
agreement about the procedure one must follow to reach that
conclusion. 3 Since the Frye general acceptance test compels a
more stringent inquiry than Daubert,"' the Syndrome premised on
survivor theory II should not receive a negative finding in any of the
jurisdictions currently allowing the Battered Woman Syndrome
premised exclusively on learned helplessness. A similar evaluation by
the courts is likely since both theories employ the exact same
methodology, but merely reach different conclusions based on that
procedure.
Except for difficulties encountered in attempting to measure
criteria more appropriate to hard sciences," 8 the Battered Woman
Syndrome, with survivor theory II as one of its scientific bases, satisfies
the Daubert "suggested requirements" and thus should be admitted as
an appropriate topic for expert testimony.
SECTION III: DETERMINING THE FEDERAL STANDARD FOR
EVIDENTIARY REVIEW OF "AMENDED" SCIENTIFIC THEORIES UNDER
DAUBERT
The current judicial system's wary treatment of novel scientific
theories is neither new nor always misplaced. In today's courtroom,
GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34, at 105-11 (recounting the procedures used to collect data
used in the research including sampling, interviews, and questionnaires which were subject to
a set of variables and comparisons).
134. See supra notes 40-60 and accompanying text.
135. See Dutton, supra note 19, at 1218-21 (providing an overview of the cognitive reactions
to abuse affecting the battered woman's perception of her situation).
136. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 (1993).
137. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
138. Contra Bleil, supra note 113, at 74 (noting "[t]here is nothing in the decision of the
United States Supreme Court which indicates that expert testimony concerning human
motivation and behavioral sciences, or what some call 'soft' scientific evidence, is subject to a
set of rules different from other expert testimony").
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the frequency of conflicts between experts contributes to the courts'
suspicions that a crafty lawyer can always find an expert to express a
specific point of view.13  The plethora of so-called 'Junk sciences"
being thrown atjudges is likely to result in some novel, yet scientifical-
ly credible, theories being held inadmissible. 4 ' As presented in
Section II, survivor theory II was perceived as more closely resembling
an amendment 141 to the existing theory of Battered Woman Syn-
drome, rather than a thoroughly novel type of expert evidence. In an
attempt to ascertain how lower federal courts are using Daubert as the
appropriate test for admissibility of either amended or novel expert
testimony, an electronic search of federal court cases was conducted,
and its results examined. 4 2 The first step was to analyze these cases
for examples of "amended" scientific theories. The electronic search
did not reveal any cases expressly discussing amended theories. The
closest statement by a court regarding an amended theory aealt with
how it would treat new techniques of DNA profiling.
In an opinion considering admissibility of DNA profiling, in
general, and the FBI's specific procedures applying that profiling, in
particular, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Martinez authorized
future judges to take judicial notice of "DNA fingerprinting," which
demonstrated proper application of a reliable methodology.' Of
139. See Paul C. Gianelli, YJunk Science": The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
105, 106 (1993) (discussing Fifth CircuitJudge Higginbotham's criticisms of expert testimony
as being two-fold with the first criticism being that "experts whose opinions are available to the
highest bidder have no place testifying in a court of law").
140. As well as some scientifically "incredible" theories being disallowed.
141. The term "amended" here narrowly refers only to those scientific theories previously
accepted by thejudicial system as valid topics for expert testimony, but which have subsequently
experienced a change in their underlying theories or procedures. Amended theories are to be
distinguished from novel scientific theories which presumably are screened by the court for the
first time in a particular jurisdiction to determine their acceptability as legitimate topics of
expert testimony.
142. The author conducted a Westlaw search on April 5, 1994, to locate any federal court's
mention of"Daubert v. Merrell Dow" after May, 1993 (the case was decided on June 28, 1993).
The search resulted in 75 cases which were electronically submitted to Westlav (excluding
decisions of courts which may not be included on Westlaw), including 39 circuit court cases and
36 lower court decisions. With the exception of the Eleventh Circuit, the other circuit courts
based decisions on Daubert. For the circuit cases which examined the lower courts' admission
or exclusion of expert scientific testimony under a test other than Dauber, the overwhelming
majority of these decisions were affirmed (19 out of 33 published opinions). Only a handful
were reversed and/or remanded (6). The reason for conducting a federal case law search is
primarily due to the conformity of standards gained by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Since most
states follow a similar or identical standard to the Federal Rules, the use of federal cases
exclusively should eliminate any problems arising from slight differences in those remaining
states whose rules of'evidence do not mirror federal standards.
143. United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1197 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that such notice,
absent a "preliminary showing that the expert properly performed a reliable methodology," did
"not mean that expert testimony concerning DNA profiling is automatically admissible under
Daubert").
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particular significance for this paper is the court's caveat that for any
new techniques of DNA profiling to be admitted, an in limine hearing
applying the Daubert standard would be necessary.144 Consequently,
while a new procedure did not necessarily preclude admission of
expert testimony on DNA profiling, the mere fact that a court
admitted earlier testimony based on a different technique did not
guarantee admission of that testimony if it was based on a new
technique.
Thus, at least in the Eighth Circuit, a change in a scientific
procedure's underlying technique would likely be independently
subject to the Daubert test prior to the admission of expert testimony
on that topic, despite previous acceptance of the procedure. In light
of state courts' treatment of psychological evidence,4  a change in
the underlying theory of a scientific procedure would be subject to
the same independent testing, no more difficult nor easy, than that
for new scientific theories or techniques. While Martinez provides
insight into how one circuit would likely treat the problem of a
change in the Battered Woman Syndrome's theoretical underpin-
nings, the dearth of cases treating amended theories from the other
circuits leaves the issue solidly in uncharted waters, offering no
additional support of the Eighth Circuit's brief dicta.
Since only one case out of the seventy-five examined remotely
addressed the issue of how amended scientific theories are treated, a
decision was made to re-canvass the cases to determine how courts
treat the admissibility of novel scientific theories. The hope was to
submit the paradigm shift toward survivor theory II to a worst case
scenario. Thus, the theory would not be tested as an amended
theory, which had gained prior acceptance by the courts, but tested
strictly as a novel theory.
146
In general, the Supreme Court favors the jury hearing the evidence,
novel or not, as long as the scientific methodologies or procedures
144. Id.
145. See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of the Fr2ye
test to both hard and soft sciences).
146. The rationale for this treatment is, if a court decides a shift to survivor theory II
fundamentally changes Battered Woman Syndrome, then it would be subjected to entirely
independent evidentiary scrutiny (even though previous literature on the Syndrome would
undoubtedly be used to prove the cycle of violence theory, battered women's behavior and
reactions, methodology and procedure, etc.). This is in contrast to review of the Syndrome as
an amended theory. Presumably, since most courts have previously accepted the Syndrome, the
threshold for its amended admission would be lower, and the court would limit consideration
to the survivor II element, rather than re-examine the entire body of knowledge on the Battered
Woman Syndrome. To subject the theory to the tougher of these two standards, that reserved
for novel theories, should provide a "worst case" decision on admissibility.
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being considered sufficiently fulfill the Daubert criteria. 147  The
Daubert Court, specifically addressing respondent's fears of a "'free-for-
all' in which befuddled juries are confounded by absurd and
irrational pseudoscientific assertions," further notes that "[v]igorous
cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence and careful
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropri-
ate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence."'48 Where
these safeguards do not work, the judge can use judicial authority to
direct a verdict or grant summary judgment.
149
To determine Daubert's application to novel scientific theories, the
seventy-five cases previously located were re-examined. 50 Similar to
the first search for cases dealing with amended scientific theories, this
survey uncovered sparse precedent. In those cases in which novel
scientific testimony was deemed of insufficient validity, there was little
or no scientific foundation for the testimony.15 The results dis-
cussed below include those sciences which, while not necessarily
labeled novel by the courts, nevertheless fit the definition of a novel
theory.
52
For example, one case involved a physician who claimed to be able
to determine whether a cataract was radiation-induced by mere visual
inspection.'53 While not presented per se as a novel science, the
court apparently determined this testimony described an unacceptable
novel science when it found that none of the sources cited by the
physician stated that radiation-induced cataracts were visually
detectible."'
A second example involved an expert who testified that ibuprofen
caused the plaintiff's renal failure. 5 When pressed for the basis of
147. SeeDaubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993) (stating
that use of "conventional devices [attacking expert testimony], rather than wholesale exclusion
under an uncompromising 'general acceptance' test, are the appropriate safeguards where the
... testimony meets the standards of Rule 702").
148. Id. One court has interpreted this as "merely shift[ing] to the trial judge the
responsibility for keeping 'junk science' out of the courtroom." See Wilson v. City of Chicago,
6 F.3d 1233, 1238 (7th Cir. 1993).
149. Dauber4 113 S. Ct. at 2798 (stating the judge is free to use these tools where "the
scintilla of evidence presented supporting a position is insufficient").
150. See supra note 142 (explaining what the survey entailed).
151. See infra notes 153-69 and accompanying text.
152. Some might view the use of the word novel as too accommodating for several of these
examples, preferring the earlier mentioned classification ofjunk science instead. See Gianelli,
supra note 139.
153. O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090, 1106 (7th Cir. 1994) (ruling a
physician's unsupported expert opinion was inadmissible).
154. Id. (reporting that "the articles referenced by [the expert] establish that [his]
methodology has no basis in scientific fact").
155. Porter v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1993) (upholding the exclusion
of experts' testimony because it was based solely on subjective belief).
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her opinion, the expert subsequently admitted a lack of scientific
support.'5 6 Again, while not labeled novel, the fact that the expert
herself identified her opinion as "curb side" with no scientific
support,' would likely make her theory that ibuprofen leads to
renal failure, at best, a novel one.
A third case, which warrants a closer look, involved plaintiff's
experts who used unrecognized methodologies to support their theory
that use of Primatene Tablets and Primatene Mist158 during preg-
nancy resulted in birth defects.' 59 In doing so, the experts relied on
in vivo and in vitro studies involving animals. 60 The court observed
that while over 2,000 agents have been shown to cause birth malfor-
mations in animals, only twenty-five to thirty of those agents have
been shown to have a corresponding effect on humans.' 61 In spite
of this fact, plaintiff's experts extrapolated on in vitro and in vivo
animal studies to prove causation. 62 In combination with numerous
other deficiencies, including lack of peer review of the experts'
conclusions, 63 a high rate of erroneous results, 164 and non-compli-
ance with generally accepted methodology in the relevant scientific
field, 165 the court held the testimony inadmissible.1 66  The use of
in vivo and in vitro animal studies, absent corroborating human
studies, to determine causality for human birth defects was deemed
an unacceptable novel theory.
1 67
156. Id. (quoting the doctor as testifying that "[i]f. .. you were asking [for] an analytical,
scientific opinion, then, I would have to research it, and I have neither the time nor the
inclination to do that").
157. Id.
158. Over-the-counter asthma treatments.
159. Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 1994 WL 80840, 80880 (D.V.I. 1994) (concluding
the anecdotal and animal-based data relied on by plaintiff's experts did not meet the criteria
required by the relevant scientific disciplines).
160. Id. (describing the evidence gathered from studies using chick embryos and rabbits).
161. Id. (noting also that, while animal studies may provide useful information, data from
them cannot be generalized to humans).
162. See infra note 167 (explaining the problems with extrapolation between human and
animal studies).
163. Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 1994 WL 80840, 80878 (D.V.I 1994) (finding
"there is no evidence that any of the methodologies advanced by plaintiff's experts has been
subjected to peer-review among the community of scientists").
164. Id. (concluding that plaintiff's experts' methodologies were likely to have "an
extraordinarily high rate of error").
165. Id. at 80876 (averring that "each of plaintiff's expert witnesses used a methodology not
recognized by the relevant scientific community, and not subject to scientific verification").
166. Id. (holding "[t]herefore, each of their opinions was not helpful and must be
excluded").
167. Perhaps to label this a novel theory is unfair since research has been done which
indicates application of test results foranimals to humans is inappropriate. Specifically, the court
indicates scientists have determined extrapolation between animal and human studies invalid
due to the "principle of species specificity [which] has been tested and demonstrates that
different species can react differently to the same agent." Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Lab., Inc.,
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In contrast, one case which admitted expert testimony on a novel
theory concerned the effect of a DPT vaccination shot on a child's
existing heart condition. 68  Citing the expert's reliance on a
prominent textbook in the field, as well as two articles describing
children who suffered similar reactions to the vaccination, the court
held a sufficient scientific basis was presented to sustain admission of
testimony on the theory.69
All of the above cases were surveyed with an eye toward construct-
ing guidelines for obtaining admission of amended scientific evidence
in federal courts. Unfortunately, the first survey offered little insight
into how the courts would treat the concept of an amended scientific
theory.' ° The second survey, however, revealed several decisions
applying the Daubert standard to novel scientific theories.'7 ' Thus,
given the absence of illustrative cases on amended theories, guidance
is sought from those cases dealing with novel sciences, and some
direction is offered.1
72
First, a minimum requirement is a "modicum" of scientific support
for the expert's theory and its methodology. While it is not clear how
many pieces of peer-reviewed literature are sufficient to constitute a
modicum of scientific support, a theory lacking in scientific support
altogether is inadmissible.' 73  Problems arise with cases which fall
somewhere between the imaginary lines of "no scientific foundation"
and "sufficient foundation." Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible
1994 WL 80840, 80880 (D.V.1. 1994). In addition, "[a]nother principle, Karnofsky's Law
demonstrates that, at some dosage, virtually any substance [causes defects] in an animal species."
Id. Finally, the court determines that "[b]ecause of these tested principles, the scientific
community does not extrapolate from experimental animal studies to the human experience."
Id. It is not altogether clear, however, in part given the lack of a citation for this statement,
whether this type of extrapolation has ever been attempted in similar circumstances. If no other
expert has ever contended in court that in vitro studies about birth defects in animals are
relevant, then the theory could still fit the definition of novel, at least as far as the judicial
system is concerned.
168. Leary v. Secretary of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 1994 WL 43395, 43404 (Cf. Ct.
1994) (allowing testimony on the vaccination's aggravation of an existing condition of
myocarditis, in spite of the expert's uncertainty over the "exact mechanism by which such
aggravation actually took place... [due in part to] the exceedingly rare nature of this type of
event... [and the lack of a] large body of scientific knowledge ... regarding the administration
of DPT vaccinations and any resulting cardiac damage").
169. Id. at 43405 (identifying "the necessary scientific underpinnings to enable me to find,
by a preponderance, that... [plaintiff's] underlying myoarditis was significantly aggravated by
the... DPT vaccination").
170. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' lack of treatment
of amended scientific theories).
171. See discussion supra notes 150-69 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 153-69 and accompanying text (suggesting that accepted methodology,
peer review, and portrayal of scientific evidence as non-static, all increase the likelihood that
novel and amended theories will be accepted in court).
173. See cases cited supra notes 153-69 and accompanying text.
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to predict what an individual judge will decide when determining
whether the evidence meets the sufficient foundation criteria.
Nonetheless, while it remains unclear where the minimum
threshold lies, this should not preclude seeking admission of a novel
scientific theory. For example, use of an accepted methodology
within the scientific field in question greatly increases the probability
the testimony will be admitted. 7 4 Subjecting a theory to peer
review increases the odds that the minimum requirement is met.175
Where peer review occurs, the state cases discussed earlier indicate
that a lack of information about error rates or general scientific
acceptance would be unlikely to preclude admission. 76 Similarly,
if the scientific theory is weak on methodology, then it is imperative
that other factors be met, such as peer review, or general acceptance
within the relevant scientific field. In borderline cases, the court
should allow the testimony, relying on opposing counsel's vigorous
cross-examination and presentation of contrary evidence to attack the
evidence's weak points.
17 7
Second, similar to the court's treatment of a novel, or previously
unadmitted scientific theory, an amended scientific theory would
probably be subject to Daubert as well. An amended theory, in
contrast to a novel one, would likely have a significantly easier task of
meeting the standard. This is especially true, as in the present case,
if only one of its underlying tenets changed. For example, an
amended theory may more accurately explain the statistical findings
of the scientific community, perhaps even lowering the procedure's
error rate. The amended theory may also garner favorable peer
review, where previously there was only unfavorable commentary. In
these situations, the amendment itself may provide the necessary
support to meet the Daubert standard-support which the previous,
unamended theory lacked.
1 71
Finally, cases specifically acknowledge that scientific theories are
constantly amended as new information is discovered. 179 Scientific
174. See Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 1994 WL 80840, 80880 (D.V.1. 1994)
(discussing the insufficiency of animal studies for extrapolation to the human teratologic field).
175. See Leary v. Secretary of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 1994 WL 43395, 43405 (Cl.
Ct. 1994) (holding two articles and one textbook to constitute sufficient peer-review and
publication, as well as general acceptance in the field).
176. See supra notes 115-28 and accompanying text (examining different courts' application
of "general acceptance" within the relevant scientific community).
177. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993).
178. This scenario would not be unlikely if the amendment made the theory better fit the
available data, while all other factors remained constant.
179. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 (1993)
(indicating that scientific theories are "subject to further testing and refinement") (quoting Brief
for American Association for the Advancement of Science and the National Academy of Sciences
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knowledge is recognized in Hodges v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., as constantly being changed, refined and amended as
new tests and data accumulate.' 80  One circuit court emphasized
that "by requiring ... the inquiry be focused solely on the methodolo-
gy and principles underlying the proffered scientific expert testimony,
the Daubert court has instructed the courts that they are not to be
concerned with the reliability of the conclusions generated by valid
methods, principles,-and reasoning."181 Thus, if valid scientific
methods are employed then it follows that the conclusions are
scientifically valid 8 ' and once the testimony meets this criteria, the
court should admit it.
Given the liberal spirit of the rules echoed by Daubert and subse-
quent federal cases, it is unlikely that a court would refuse to
recognize the Battered Woman Syndrome based on survivor theory II
as an appropriate topic for expert testimony.
SECTION IV: AN ANALYSIS OF THE BENEFITS ACCRUED FROM THE
INCORPORATION OF SURVIVOR THEORY II INTO THE BATTERED
WOMAN SYNDROME
One benefit of a shift from learned helplessness to the survivor
theory II model is the resulting positive characterization of battered
women as survivors, rather than the negative image of battered
women as passive victims. 8 Closely related is the expectation that
battered women who do not conform to the stereotypical pattern 84
would be able to fit the adapted model's more flexible and realistic
criteria. Finally, evidence of the woman's help-seeking behavior serves
the dual purpose of bolstering her credibility before the jury,1
8 5
while concurrently eliminating contradictory messages inherent within
the theory of learned helplessness.
Several other benefits arise from modifying the traditional Battered
Women Syndrome to incorporate the survivor theory II model. First,
from a societal point of view, the characterization of battered women
7-8).
180. 9 F.3d 958, 966 (Cl. Ct. 1993).
181. United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 556 (7th Cir. 1993).
182. Id.
183. See Schneider, supra note 17, at 234 (noting how continued reliance on learned
helplessness perpetuates erroneous stereotypes of women as victims, while denying the complex
reality of battered women's responses).
184. For example, "[tihe victim may not be thought of as the 'typical' battered woman if she
has a history of prostitution, ... or if she has been observed to behave angrily, is known to
abuse her children, is trained in the use of a weapon, or is physically larger than her abusive
partner." Dutton, supra note 19, at 1195 n.17.
185. See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
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as subservient victims, rather than determined survivors, has serious
repercussions in terms of promoting or challenging stereotypes.186
Second, and equally important, these characterizations impose
perilous boundaries on what society perceives as the standard pattern
of the battered woman,'87 within which defendants must fit their
own life experiences.188 Especially among those who view the
Battered Woman Syndrome defense as an excuse or justification,'
8 9
it is practically impossible to convince them that a woman suffers from
learned helplessness-and thus deserves what they perceive as
leniency-when she is unable to fit the mold.9 ° For example, if she
uses drugs, actively fights back, participates in arguments with her
husband,'9 ' or fails to conform to the battered woman stereotype
because of a different ethnic origin,192 she undoubtedly will have
186. Some courts seem to treat battered woman syndrome as a standard to which all
battered women must conform rather than as evidence that illuminates the defendant's
behavior and perceptions. As a result, a defendant may be considered a battered
woman only if she never left her husband, never sought assistance, and never fought
back. Unless she fits this rigidly-defined and narrowly-applied definition, she is
prevented from benefiting from Battered Woman Syndrome testimony.
Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense 8 HARV.
L.J. 121, 144 (1985). Schneider, supra note 17, at 234 (stating "[t]he notion of battered woman
syndrome contains the seeds of old stereotypes of women in new form-the victimized and the
passive battered woman, too paralyzed to act because of her own incapacity").
187. See Dutton, supra note 19, at 1196 (noting there is no single standard of behavior or
pattern exhibited by battered women).
188. "[A]ppellate cases on the issue suggest that expert testimony is not being admitted
where it is most needed-where the woman's experiences and the circumstances of the
homicide are indeed most 'different'." Schneider, supra note 17, at 216.
189. [T]he danger of the battered woman syndrome approach is that it revives concepts
of excuse.... [I]t focuses on the woman's defects .... It implies that she is limited
because of herweakness and her problems.... The opinion [in State v. Kelly) seems to
suggest that admission of expert testimony is primarily important because the battered
woman 'suffers' from the syndrome and could not be expected to leave her home, not
because it is relevant to the reasonableness of her act. The court is willing to extend
its 'protection' and admit the testimony because the battered woman is perceived as
weak.
Schneider, supra note 17, at 234 (emphasis in original) (citing State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372-
73 (N.J. 1984)).
190. See Schneider, supra note 17, at 234-35 (conveying the ramifications of rigid adherence
to stereotypes, and how this severely curtails many women's options to explain their behavior).
One unfortunate consequence of a rigid classification of the battered woman is that "women
who depart from this stereotype, because of their own life situations or because the facts of their
cases do not fit this perspective, are not likely to be able to take advantage ofjudicial solicitude."
Id.
191. See Crocker, supra note 186, at 145 (explaining the tension between stereotypical and
real behavior that binds battered women). "If the defendant has tried to resist [her batterer]
in the past, the court accepts this as evidence that rebuts her status as a battered woman." Id.
In addition, studies indicate that fighting back is a common reaction of these women. GELLES
& STRAUS, supra note 57, at 148 (noting that "[n]early one in four victims (24 percent) hit their
attacker back"). See supra note 184 (describing examples of atypical battered women).
192. See supra note 186 and accompanying text; Schneider, supra note 17, at 234-35 n.144 &
146 (describing the problems in a battered woman self-defense case involving a black woman
who did not conform to the battered woman syndrome stereotype; also hypothesizing different
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problems convincing the judge and jury that she deserves expert
testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome. These problems may arise
from the testimony itself being held inadmissible, or from the jury's
assessment that, since she does not fit the mold, the theory does not
apply to her.
Finally, it is vital that battered women be defined as survi-
vors-women whose efforts to either terminate or escape their abuse
often escalated the violence from their batterers, 193 and was usually
met by general disinterest from society. Such an insight helps
illustrate how the battered woman's actions are indeed those of a
reasonable person.194 Battered women do search for alternatives to
their situations, and even when none are forthcoming, their help-
seeking continues. Battered women's shelters, lauded as the saviors
of countless abused women,195 are incredibly underfunded and
alarmingly limited in the number of women they are able to
assist.' 96 Other resources for battered women are insufficient.
97
results where economic classes are varied-i.e., between "upper class" and "lower class" battered
women) (quoting Letter from Barbara Hart, Attorney, to Elizabeth M. Schneider, (Nov. 30,
1984) (on file with the author)).
193. See BROWNE, supra note 3, at 115 (explaining that "[t ] he point of, or even the discussion
of, separation is one of the most dangerous times for partners in a violent relationship"). "For
many battered women, leaving their mates and living in constant fear of reprisal or death seems
more intolerable than remaining, despite their fears of further harm." Id. "The women's fears
of retaliation were supported by their past experiences with the men's violence, as well as by
threats of further violence if they attempted to leave." Id. at 114. See generally CLEARINGHOUSE,
supra note 2, at 181-87 (detailing the numerous statistical studies indicating that a woman is in
the most danger when attempting to escape her batterer's control).
194. Learned helplessness, on the other hand, tends to depict battered women as unreason-
able. "Although the term is purely descriptive, its psychological content and the language and
import of the term carry a different message. Regardless of its more complex meaning, the term
'battered woman syndrome' has been heard to communicate an implicit but powerful view that
battered women are all the same, that they are suffering from a psychological disability and that
this disability prevents them from acting 'normally.'" Schneider, supra note 17, at 225-26.
195. See SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF
THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 33 (1982) (noting "[tfhe influence of the women's
liberation movement on the battered women's movement is illustrated concretely in hundreds
of shelters and women's crisis centers in the United States"). But cf, Richard A. Berk, PhyllisJ.
Newton & Sarah F. Berk, What a Difference a Day Makes: An Empirical Study of the Impact of Shelters
for Battered Women, 48J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 481, 481 (1986) ("predict[ing] that shelters will have
beneficial effects only for battery victims who are already taking control of their lives. For other
women, a shelter stay may in the short run encourage retaliation.... [the study reveals] that
our hypotheses are by and large supported.").
196. See GEL.ES & STRAUS, supra note 57, at 112-13 (noting that even though the number of
shelters increased in ten years from four to more than one thousand, this number is unable to
accommodate more than a million battered women). "Thus for all practical purposes there is
not enough space for 80 to 90 percent [sic] of the severely and repeatedly battered women in
America." Id. at 176. "Despite the rapid increase in numbers over the last few years the number
of institutions, such as houses or shelters, available for the women to flee to safety are still
limited." DOMESrIC VIOLENCE BEHIND THE CURTAINS 119 (Alison Landes, Carol D. Foster & Mark
A. Siegel eds., 1991); SCHECHTER, supra note 195, at 243-44 (explaining the "dilemmas every
shelter faces, both of meeting the immediate needs ofshelter residents and of offering assistance
to the countless women who must be turned away because there is no space available"). See
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In light of the scarcity of economic assistance, tightness of the job
market, lack of affordable child care and housing, and general
shortage of other resources,198 it not surprising that a battered
woman will return to her batterer rather than risk either becoming
homeless, 9  or hazarding further injury."0  By survivor theory
standards, her actions take on the more favorable appearance of
reasonableness. 20 1  Theories of social learning emphasize that
people learn to respond to certain situations given what has proven
successful, or more importantly unsuccessful, in the past.
20 2 If
attempts to escape result in more severe abuse for the woman, then
it becomes reasonable for her to stay.
Thus, adoption of the survivor theory II as an underpinning of the
Battered Woman Syndrome offers several benefits, including an
increased ability to explain the woman's actions as reasonable, a
better statistical fit to the underlying data, and a more realistic
portrayal of the battered woman who tries to escape her abuse but is
constantly forced to return to her batterer.
generally CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 2, at 174-75 (offering tragic statistics on the number of
battered women that are denied shelter).
197. See WALKER, supra note 21, at 141 (showing that women often received inadequate
response from the criminal justice system in that "[blureaucratic delays, inadequate responses,
and lack of knowledge and training prevented the institution from being responsive in life
threatening situations").
198. See Schneider, supra note 17, at 221 (noting the common social and economic problems
facing battered women). "If women had equal status with men in social, political, economic,
educational, and family areas, then [women] would be less likely to live with spouse abuse."
WALKER, supra note 21, at 118.
199. See SCHECHTER, supra note 195, at 288 (explaining the preconditions which must exist
to end violence, including, "shelter, adequate jobs, income, free health care, affordable housing
and child care").
200. See supra note 193 (discussing the separation violence faced by many battered women,
and how the threat of further violence acts as a significant deterrent to women leaving abusive
partners).
201. Schneider argues that "[d]efense lawyers and experts should emphasize the common
aspects of the battered women's experience, both her helplessness and her behavioral
adjustments that allow her to survive, her desperate coping, her unique insight and ability to
know and anticipate the degree of violence she faces, and her painful understanding of the
paucity of alternatives available to women in this culture." Schneider, supra note 17, at 240.
Schneider further posits that "[t]his fuller description of battered women's experiences is both
more accurate and better explains to judges and juries why a battered woman doesn't leave the
house and why she kills to save her own life." Id. It is important to realize that the survivor
theory does not completely exclude the fact that battered women often feel helpless. See supra
note 62 and accompanying text. In fact, element two of the Gondolf and Fisher model notes
anxiety and uncertainty on the woman's part, as well as the lack of viable alternatives, all of
which contribute to the woman remaining with the batterer. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 34,
at 12. It is entirely understandable for the woman to feel helpless when faced with such a
scenario.
202. See supra note 87 (discussing the concept of social learning especially as applied to how
battered women are "trained" to react based on past abuse experiences).
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CONCLUSION
On behalf of the estimated two million battered women in the
United States alone,"' this article stresses the need for inclusion of
survivor theory II, with its recognition of the help-seeking activities of
battered women, 04 into the underlying theoretical premises of
Battered Woman Syndrome. The implications for policy-making, for
battered women's self-defense claims, as well as the data's strong
empirical support of the survivor theory II modifications, all persua-
sively argue for its incorporation into the expert testimony arsenal of
Battered Woman Syndrome. Advocates must actively counter the
perception that only "good" abused women are described by the
Syndrome. It is unquestionably a disservice to battered women for
the legal profession to continue offering an incomplete and skewed
perception of battered women's behavior.
While there may be potential risks to such a paradigmatic shift,
such as the fear the court will rule the testimony inadmissible, the
perceived benefits far outweigh such considerations. Without the
valuable insight into battered women's daily circumstances, provided
by the survivor theory II, more innocent women will be punished for
acting in reasonable self-defense. 5 Allowing only battered women
who fit a largely unrealistic model to benefit from the explanatory
power of the Battered Woman Syndrome places an intolerable burden
on the rights of women everywhere.
It is imperative that the legal profession take the first steps to
eradicate the vestiges of sexism inherent in learned helplessness.
Adoption of the survivor theory II and its consistent statistical findings
will enable the law to eliminate the inherent contradiction and
stereotypical backlash of learned helplessness as currently applied in
Battered Woman Syndrome. Anything less borders on criminal.
203. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (utilizing the weight of statistical data to
emphasize the immediate need for national attention).
204. See supra notes 40-60 and accompanying text (outlining the types of help-seeking
battered women attempt and how the survivor theory II model more accurately explains the
behavior).
205. In fact, most battered women do not meet the stereotype reflected in Battered Woman
Syndrome in some way or another. Dutton Interview, supra note 36. The notion of a common,
singular profile may be misleading. Id. For example, thejury may look at a particular defendant
and say she doesn't fit the stereotype because 'she looks angry" or "she fought back," and may
therefore conclude that these theories don't apply to her. Id. Simply because the defendant does
not fit the stereotype of a battered woman does not mean that she did not reasonably perceive
herself to be in danger at that moment. Id. To deny her the use of Battered Woman Syndrome
testimony to help explain the reasonableness of her actions is equivalent to institutionally
maintaining the stereotype. Id.
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